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ABSTRACT
In February 2006, in what the Rhode Island Supreme Court and others around the country called a “mon-
umental lawsuit,” a jury of six men and women held lead pigment manufacturers liable for creating what
some have called the largest and longest on-going public health disaster for children in United States his-
tory. The State of Rhode Island’s Attorney General’s Office had initiated the suit nearly six years before
charging that the historical record showed the industry had knowingly sold and profited from a product
that they knew poisoned children. The attorneys representing the State argued that lead paint on the walls,
woodwork, and windowsills of nearly 80 percent of the State’s housing constituted a public nuisance that
would lead to further cases of childhood lead poisoning in the coming years. The defense argued that the
industry was not to blame. Instead, they placed responsibility for the epidemic on landlords for not main-
taining their properties and on parents, most of whom were African-American and Latino, for not su-
pervising their children more scrupulously. This article looks at the long, sad history of blaming children,
parents, and even public health officials for the on-going tragedy of lead poisoning.
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IN FEBRUARY 2006, in what the Rhode Island SupremeCourt and others around the country called a “monu-
mental lawsuit” a jury of six men and women held lead
pigment manufacturers liable for creating what some
have called the largest and longest on-going public health
disaster for children in United States history.1 The State
of Rhode Island’s Attorney General’s Office had initiated
the suit nearly six years before charging that the histori-
cal record showed the industry had knowingly sold and
profited from a product that they knew poisoned chil-
dren. The attorneys representing the State argued that
lead paint on the walls, woodwork, and windowsills of
nearly 80 percent of the State’s housing constituted a pub-
lic nuisance that would lead to further cases of childhood
lead poisoning in the coming years. As with any public
nuisance whose damage could be foreseen, the State held
that action be taken to remove the lead so that children
would not be in harm’s way by those who had created
the hazard: the lead pigment manufacturers of the coun-
try. The defense argued that the industry was not to
blame. Instead, they placed responsibility for the epi-
demic on landlords for not maintaining their properties
and on parents, most of whom were African-American
and Latino, for not supervising their children more
scrupulously.2 Childhood lead poisoning has been iden-
tified as an environmental justice issue and this lawsuit
held out the promise that future cases of lead poisoning
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1 The authors of this article were expert witnesses for the State
of Rhode Island and testified at the trial.
2 In other lead cases where individual children were suing NL
Industries, manufacturers of Dutch Boy lead pigment between
1890s and the 1950s, for damages the defense has argued that the
extended families of the lead poisoned were to blame because
“the problems found in the children are genetic and not due 
to exposure to lead-based paint.” [See: “Mississippi Residents 
Allege Lead Poisoning from Apartments,” http://injury.find-
law.com/lead/lead-news.html (accessed: September 11, 2008)].
In a case in Milwaukee against the lead pigment manufacturers
a similar “defense” was used in which defense attorneys placed
responsibility for the child’s neurological deficits on social-
biological history of the children and the family.
could finally be prevented in Rhode Island and poten-
tially in other states as well.
The first trial had resulted in a hung jury and in De-
cember 2005, a second trial began. The new trial lasted
four months and after hundreds of hours of deposition,
scores of witnesses, numerous motions to dismiss, and in-
tense national attention, the jury decided in favor of the
State and ordered that the lead industry provide funds
for the abatement of the lead paint hazard by replacing
lead painted windows and doorframes and the removal
of lead from the walls of about 80 percent of the State’s
private housing stock, at a cost of anywhere from $1.2 to
$4 billion.1, 2
The decision brought into high relief the environmen-
tal damage and physical harm lead paint has caused thou-
sands of Rhode Island children, particularly African-
American and Latino children who lived in the oldest and
most poorly maintained houses in Providence and other
urban communities around the state. In Rhode Island and
across the country the Centers for Disease Control has
documented that African American and Latino children
are disproportionately affected by lead poisoning and
have suffered neurological, behavioral, and physiological
damage as a resulted of elevated blood-lead levels. The
jury’s decision, after the longest civil trial in Rhode Island
history, was considered a landmark decision that could
influence attorneys general around the country to bring
similar lawsuits and to begin a process that would finally
end the environmental scourge of lead poisoning that has
affected millions of American children over the course of
the past century.3
Despite the fact that the case had been nearly a decade
in the making, had entailed thousands of hours of legal
preparation, scores of depositions, weeks of testimony,
and hundreds of thousands of documents, on July 1, 2008
the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the jury’s de-
cision, stating that the case was brought to court under
the “wrong law” and that the suit should never have been
allowed to proceed. The court ruled that “in reaching this
conclusion, we do not mean to minimize the severity of
the harm that thousands of children in Rhode Island have
suffered as a result of lead poisoning. Our hearts go out
to those children whose lives forever have been changed
by the poisonous presence of lead. But, however grave
the problem of lead poisoning is in Rhode Island, public
nuisance law simply does not provide a remedy for this
harm.”4
The Supreme Court was obviously aware of the his-
torical significance of this case and of the enormous dam-
age to thousands upon thousands of past victims of
leaded paint.5 It was also aware that by allowing the jury
decision to stand it would spur other suits by other states
throughout the country, possibly resulting in the bank-
ruptcy of major American corporations. But, we should
ask other questions about the Supreme Court decision.
Specifically, it is difficult not to wonder whether the de-
cision on the narrow grounds of “wrong law” would not
have been different if the children affected and the com-
munities impacted were white and middle class. After all,
if an epidemic that caused possible brain injury of another
sort—say, meningitis—affected one tenth of the number
of American children as did this human-made condition,
we might expect that a popular uproar over the dangers
to the children would lead to a massive effort to resolve
the problem. But here, we are left to wonder whether the
race of the children, the power of the industry, and the
unwillingness of the courts to confront the historical na-
ture of this decision to hold industry accountable led to
a reversal that will condemn yet another generation of
children to lowered IQs, behavioral disorders, school fail-
ure, and lives doomed before they even started. To begin
to answer this question we need to understand the social
history of childhood lead poisoning and the ways that the
historical framing of the child-victims of lead poisoning
has allowed this tragedy to continue for over a century.
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
The use of lead carbonate as a pigment for house paint
led to an enormous environmental disaster as lead paint
was used to cover the walls, woodwork, windowsills, ceil-
ings, toys, and floors in homes. As we have detailed else-
where, as early as 1900 lead pigment was identified as a
“slow, cumulative poison” that affected working men and
women in a variety of industries. By 1904, childhood lead
poisoning was identified as a serious problem in Australia
for children who crawled on lead-painted floors, who
chewed on lead-painted toys, cribs, and windowsills, and
who sucked on fingers covered with the fine lead dust
that came off of walls and all the other objects around the
house. In 1914, Henry Thomas and Kenneth Blackfan re-
ported on cases of childhood lead poisoning in the United
States in Baltimore, Maryland.6 In 1917, Blackfan pub-
lished an article that reviewed the extensive English-lan-
guage literature on lead poisoning in children. In his case
histories he noted that children were poisoned by gnaw-
ing on lead and concluded his review with the recom-
mendation that children should be prevented from eat-
ing or mouthing painted articles. He described children
who first became “fretful, peevish and often very restless
at night.” Their appetite was poor and their gums began
to bleed, and soon pain shot up and down their legs. Their
stomachs began to ache and they became constipated.
Their muscles became “so painful as not to permit the
weight of the bed-clothing.” They developed a waddling
gait, only walking on the “outside of the feet.” They
dragged their toes and their legs swung out sideways as
they walked. Soon, seizures occurred and some died.7
In the 1920s, clinicians produced a drumbeat of articles
that linked lead-based paint to lead poisoning among chil-
dren.8 These early casualties were signs of a much deeper
problem that was not being addressed. Isaac Abt argued
in his standard text on pediatrics that childhood lead poi-
soning was “more common in children than generally
supposed,”9 a point that was echoed over and over in the
coming years. In 1924 the Journal of the American Medical
Association published an article by John Ruddock that
showed that the true extent of lead poisoning in children
was understated because there were “many mild cases . . .
ROSNER AND MARKOWITZ160
manifested by spasms or colic, the true nature of which
are never suspected.”10 In 1926, Charles F. McKhann, a
Harvard physician, detailed seventeen case studies, con-
cluding that lead poisoning was “of relatively frequent
occurrence in children” and was usually associated with
the ingestion of lead paint.11, 12
From almost the first articles published, the issue of the
social class of children affected by lead poisoning marked
the problem. In part this resulted from the fact that the
demographic composition of urban America had begun
a dramatic change during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as the cities along the East coast and
Midwest expanded rapidly and as immigrants and work-
ing class peoples migrated to the jobs located in the
bustling ports and growing industrial towns. As the pop-
ulations of cities like Baltimore, New York, Boston, and
Chicago expanded so too did paints—both leaded and
non-leaded—become a cheaper alternative to the wallpa-
pers and wood finishes that were often popular among
the middle class and wealthy in the mid to late nineteenth
centuries.13
The expanding market for paint produced a vibrant
and aggressive competition among the scores of local
manufacturers. Some companies produced paint using
non-lead pigments such as lithopone, zinc and, in the
1920s, titanium-based pigments. But a few companies
emerged as the producers of lead pigment, marketed as
the “purest,” “whitest” pigment available. As the hous-
ing stock of working-class and middle class houses ex-
panded, so too did the spreading of lead over virtually
every surface young children would come in contact with.
The competitive market for paint led to intense atten-
tion to children as a tool in attracting parents to lead prod-
ucts. In Figure 1 the basic approach is simply laid out: the
National Lead Company, producers of the famous Dutch
Boy lead paint line, implored distributors to give paint
books to children who accompanied their parents into the
store. The ad told of the value that the promotion had in
reaching parents who “appreciate little concerns” shown
to the children and to children themselves. Imbedded in
some of the early ads were appeals to middle class home-
owners whose own sense of place and stability had been
threatened by a number of demographic forces altering
the landscape of northern communities. In Figure 1, Na-
tional Lead marketed its product by showing the Dutch
Boy, with a suburban house cradled in his left arm hold-
ing a bucket of lead paint. The house was being sheltered
from the “elements:” The snow (apparently blowing from
the North), the sun (apparently beating down from the
West) and a storm in the form of a racist Sambo-like de-
piction of a storm cloud (apparently threatening from the
South). Coming in the 1920s during the first African-
American migration from the south, the message was
clear: use lead paint to protect yourselves from the threats
to your middle class home.
The paint books this ad was promoting were designed
to entice children to believe that lead based paints pro-
tected them and their toys from the various dangerous
forces, generally wind, rain, snow that threatened them.
Also, they aimed at convincing children that the quality
of their lives would be enhanced by the addition of bright
colors to their surroundings, including their toys and fur-
niture (See Figure 2).
As late as 1949 National Lead remained particularly
proud of their marketing campaign to children. “Thou-
sands of homes and offices still have souvenir figures [of
the Dutch Boy Painter] in the form of paper weights, stat-
uettes, etc. The appeal was particularly strong to children
and the company has never overlooked the opportunity
to plant the trademark image in young and receptive
minds. One of the most successful promotions for many
years was a child’s paint book containing paper chips of
paint from which the pictures (including, of course, sev-
eral Dutch Boys) could be colored . . . . The company still
will loan a Dutch Boy costume—cap, wig, shirt, overalls
and wooden shoes—to any person who writes in and asks
for it for any reasonable purpose, and the little painter
has graced thousands of parades and masquerades.” This
marketing of the Dutch Boy image was seen as an essen-
tial element of National Lead Company’s profitability and
the rise of its sales “from $80,000,000 in 1939 to more than
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FIG. 1. Advertisement, “Do Not Forget the Children”
National Lead Company, 1920.
$320,000,000 in 1948.”14 The continuing use of the “Dutch
Boy” image was understood by the broader marketing in-
dustry as a clever method for improving the image of Na-
tional Lead. In 1949, one marketing journal noted that
“putting the boy, with his wooden keg and brush, in the
attitude of a house painter, gave animation to the subject,
tied him up with the product and suggested that the qual-
ity of the paint was so good that even a child could use
it.”15
EARLY VICTIM BLAMING
At the time (and even in some cases to the present), the
lead industry and its defenders argued that the real “cul-
prit” where lead poisoning was concerned was the
child.16 They were able to do so because in the 1920s many
viewed a child’s lead poisoning as the result of patho-
logical behavior on the part of the child. Some of the
physicians reporting cases of lead poisoning in children
described the poisoning as a consequence of another con-
dition, pica, often considered an abnormal craving for
non-edible substances; to make such a diagnosis put the
child’s own behavior in question, for pica was often as-
sociated with mental retardation. Others argued, how-
ever, that the problem was not the child’s behavior but
the fact that there were too many opportunities for chil-
dren to put lead in their mouths. For these physicians,
pica, if the term was used, was a normal habit, not a
pathology. This distinction had enormous social and po-
litical implications for the lead industry: if the ingestion
of lead was defined as due to the pathology of a small
number of individual children, then the lead industry
could justify the continued use of lead. But, if this gnaw-
ing and mouthing were a habit normal in children, then
the number of potential victims of poisoning would be
increased astronomically, and the industry’s responsibil-
ity less easily skirted.
Today, defenders of the lead industry argue that the
medical literature was long dominated by the view that
only certain children engaged in the “perverse” behavior
of sucking on objects and were thus at risk. However, even
a cursory survey of the articles that reported on childhood
lead poisoning reveals no such clear-cut understanding of
the term “pica.” In a survey of sixty-two such articles pub-
lished between 1840 and 1939 twenty used the term “pica”
or “perverted appetite,” and only six of the sixty-two de-
fined pica as a “pathological condition.” In most cases it
was described as part of children’s normal behavior or a
mild habit. Holt’s Diseases of Childhood, a standard pediatrics
text published in 1934, noted that pica was a habit that was
not confined to mentally deficient children; the 1940 edi-
tion noted that “Most of the children who acquire [lead
poisoning] do so during the first two years of life when it
is natural for them to put things in the mouth. The abnor-
mal persistence of this trait, pica, in older children may be
followed by lead poisoning.”17
Others echoed the view of pica as a habit, rather than
a pathological condition. Charles McKhann and Edward
Vogt, in a 1933 article in the Journal of the American Med-
ical Association argued that there were different forms of
pica and that “in the majority of cases of lead poisoning
due to ingestion of paint, the pica has apparently been
merely a pernicious habit, unrelated to any underlying
abnormal condition.”18 McKhann and Vogt note that “the
incidence of lead poisoning is highest in infants and small
children in whom teeth are erupting and in whom there
is a great tendency to put things into the mouth.”19
For the most part, sucking on fingers covered with lead
dust, placing toys and other objects in one’s mouth, bit-
ing nails and chewing cool, sweet objects like painted win-
dowsills or lead soldiers were understood as normal be-
havior for young children. In the evolving field of
psychology, developmental theorists and psychoanalysts
identified a variety of stages of child development; the
early years were viewed as a stage when children tended
to put any object they could grasp into their mouths. For
Freudians, this was deemed the “oral” stage. Many who
observed children simply noted that, in the normal act of
teething, children would chew and gnaw on objects.
Childhood lead poisoning was a condition arising both
from a set of behaviors typical of young children and the
opportunity to ingest a poison. From the very beginning
of the literature on lead poisoning, it was clear that this
was an unusual condition, one that could not simply be
attributed to abnormal behavior, but an environmental
disease in that it was related to the widespread avail-
ability of the poison itself. Unlike arsenic or other toxic
substances, which had only limited availability and were
distributed with warning labels or skull-and-crossbones
to let people know their danger, lead was everywhere and
there was no warning as to its hazards. As John Ruddock
put it, “a child lives in a lead world.”20
BLAMING THE PARENTS
From early on parents were identified by the industry
as a major reason why children were lead poisoned. Chil-
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FIG. 2. “The Dutch Boy Conquers Old Man Gloom, Na-
tional Lead Paint Book for Boys and Girls, 1929.
dren were unsupervised, it was argued, and unsuper-
vised children suffering from pica ingested lead paint by
gnawing on objects around the house. In summaries of
his activities in 1952, the Director of Health and Safety of
the Lead Industries Association (LIA), Manfred Bowditch,
called childhood lead poisoning “a major ‘headache’ and
a source of much adverse publicity.” He counted 197 re-
ports of lead poisoning in nine cities of which 40 were fa-
tal, although he noted that this was a “incomplete” esti-
mate, especially for New York City.21 In New York, 44
cases were reported of which 14 were fatal. Between 1951
and 1953, according to George M. Wheatly, of the Amer-
ican Pediatrics Association, as reported in the New York
Times, “there were 94 deaths and 165 cases of childhood
lead poisoning . . . in New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, St.
Louis, and Baltimore.”22
Reports from health departments, publicized in the
popular press, were demonstrating the widespread na-
ture of the lead paint hazard. In 1952 the LIA collected
“nearly 500 newspaper clippings featuring lead poison-
ing, often in sizable headlines.”23 The LIA noted a head-
line from the New York Daily News, “Lead Poisoning
Killed 10 Kids in Brooklyn in ‘55, Highest Toll in the City,”
that was “based largely on data from the Health Depart-
ment.”24 In addition to “the common run of newspaper
studies on childhood and other types of plumbism,” the
LIA noted two “items of adverse publicity transcending
[them] in importance.” In July 1956 Parade magazine,
which reached over 7,000,000 readers in 50 newspapers
across the country, ran an article entitled, “Don’t Let
YOUR Child Get Lead Poisoning,” and the CBS television
network also carried a broadcast on childhood lead poi-
soning.25
The LIA recognized as early as 1952 that to continue
fighting a rear-guard action attacking the extent of the
lead poisoning problem would be “prohibitively expen-
sive and time-consuming.”26 But they continued to de-
flect responsibility for this tragedy away from the indus-
try itself, placing the blame on poverty, not on the lead
industry: “the major source of trouble is the flaking of
lead paint in the ancient slum dwellings of our older cities,
[and] the problem of lead poisoning in children will be
with us for as long as there are slums.”27 Bowditch ac-
knowledged “that the overwhelmingly major source of
lead poisoning in children is from structural lead paints
chewed from painted surfaces, picked up or off in the
form of flakes, or adhering to bits of plaster and subse-
quently ingested.” But who was responsible for this con-
dition? According to Bowditch and the LIA, “Childhood
lead poisoning is essentially a problem of slum dwellings
and relatively ignorant parents.” He maintained that lead
poisoning was “almost wholly confined to the older cities
of the eastern third of the country” and that “until we can
find means to (a) get rid of our slums and (b) educate the
relatively ineducable parent, the problem will continue to
plague us.”28 At the Annual Meeting of the Lead Indus-
tries Association in 1957 Bowditch provided the public
rationalization for why lead poisoning was not a respo-
jnsibklity of the industry. “The problem of lead poison-
ing in children,” Bowditch maintained, “will be with us
for as long as there are slums.” Bowditch placed the blame
on families and parents. “Because of the high death rate,
the frequency of permanent brain damage in the sur-
vivors, and the intelligence level of the slum parents, it
seems destined to remain as important and as difficult as
any with which we have to deal.”29 Bowditch, in private
correspondence, made clear who precisely he meant by
“ineducable parents.” In a letter to Felix Wormser in July
1956, Bowditch complained that lead poisoning was “a
serious problem from the viewpoint of adverse public-
ity.” He reiterated his concern that the issue was basically
one of “slums,” saying, “the basic solution is to get rid of
our slums, but even Uncle Sam can’t seem to swing that
one.” In light of the unwillingness of the political system
to rebuild inner cities, the next possible means of ad-
dressing lead poisoning was to “educate the parents.” But
even this he rejected as impossible: “most of the cases are
in Negro and Puerto Rican families and how,” he rhetor-
ically asked Wormser, “does one tackle that job?”30
The President of the National Paint, Varnish and Lac-
quer Association (NPVLA), General Joseph F. Battley,
elaborated on this theme, but used contemporary psy-
chological explanations for rationalizing away corporate
responsibility for the pollution of children’s environ-
ments. There may be dietary deficiencies, but even “a
well-fed child,” he said, “may still be emotionally hungry
because he does not receive as much loving attention as
he needs. Another may suffer from a sense of insecurity.
To gain the comfort and reassurance they crave, they of-
ten place inedible objects [i.e., flaking paint] in their
mouths.”31 As late as 1959, lead poisoning was still a
“headache” for the industry.32 From the industry’s point
of view, the pollution of the urban environment was in-
soluble. The consequence of that viewpoint has been the
destruction generations of African American and Latino
children.
DENYING INFORMATION TO THE “INEDUCABLE”
At the same time that Bowditch and the lead industry
was arguing that the parents were “ineducable” [sic] the
industry was actively seeking to deny the necessary ed-
ucation to the very people they were blaming. This was
particularly apparent in the debate over “warning labels”
and local regulations that would limit the use of lead
paint. During 1954, a variety of city, state, professional,
and industry groups addressed the issue of what type of
warning New York City should require on paint sold in
the city. In general, the city officials wanted warning la-
bels on paint containing more than 1% lead. In May 1954
the Board of Health of New York City “asked that a draft
of a proposed sanitary code change be submitted to it in
connection with paints and coatings containing excessive
amounts of lead.” It proposed the following wording: “No
person shall have, keep or offer for sale in the City of New
York any liquid coating material or paint which contains
lead compounds of which the lead content . . . is in ex-
cess of 1%.” It also required a warning label: “Warning:
This paint contains lead—unsafe—poisonous—and
should not be used to paint children’s toys or furniture,
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or interior surfaces in dwelling units which might be
chewed by children.”33
Some of the pigment manufacturers reacted negatively
to the proposed warning. Paul Whitford, a manager in
the Eagle Picher Company, wrote to the NPVLA that “the
proposed section of the Sanitary Code, as set forth by
Jerome Trichter, . . . demands the immediate and con-
certed effort of our committee to prevent the enactment
of this legislation. The adoption of this proposal by the
Board of Health by the city of New York, places an un-
precedented stigma upon the Paint Industry by demand-
ing the labeling of innumerable shelf goods and specialty
products as unsuitable for use.”34 (By 1958, when New
York City was considering banning the use of lead paint
on the interiors of buildings and apartments, Eagle
Picher’s Paul Whitford claimed that such restrictions are
“certainly in order and if properly enforced should re-
move much of the stigma and unfavorable publicity aris-
ing from the nutritional deficiencies of children.”35) The
NPVLA pushed for a very different warning that em-
phasized paints’ flammability as well as its dangers from
ingestion. While explicitly saying, “Do not apply on toys,
furniture or interior surfaces that might be chewed by
children,” it did not have the word “poisonous” in its pro-
posal.36 The American Medical Association suggested in
September of that year that the following warning be put
on all paint: “WARNING: this paint contains an amount
of lead which may be POISONOUS and should not be
used to paint children’s toys or furniture or interior sur-
faces in dwelling units which might be chewed by chil-
dren.”37
The New York City Board of Health, at its October 29,
1954 meeting, adopted a warning label similar to the ones
above but without the word poison or poisonous. The
NPVLA noted that although “originally the word ‘poi-
son’ was proposed for the label of paints containing lead,”
it had been removed and the final wording was the “re-
sult of cooperation between the New York City Health
Department officials and representatives of the new York
and National Paint, Varnish, and Lacquer Association.”38
The LIA also claimed some credit: “The initial proposal
of the New York City Health Department to require a poi-
son label on all paints containing any lead whatsoever
was ultimately modified through the establishment, at
our instance, of a committee of the American Standards
Association which evolved a standard permitting up to
one per cent lead in paints used on surfaces which ‘might
be chewed by children,’ thus allowing the inclusion of
lead dryers in such paints. The ‘poison’ wording was also
modified.”39 They were particularly proud that “modifi-
cation of the New York City lead paint labeling regula-
tion was secured by means of American Standard Z66.1,
prepared by a committee of the American Standards As-
sociation, sponsored by the Lead Industries Association.”
They noted that “the futility of the labeling approach has
been brought to the attention of health officials in other
large municipalities and appears to have caused them to
reconsider any such plans.”40 The LIA saw warning la-
bels as a less serious threat than governmental regulation.
“Every effort is being made to confine the regulatory mea-
sures . . . to the field of warning labels, which, as applied
to paints, are obviously less detrimental to our interests
than would be any legislation of a prohibitory nature.”41
But even here the LIA did not concede any action it did
not need to. Bowditch told Felix Wormser, now an As-
sistant Secretary in the Department of Interior in the
Eisenhower Administration, that he made every effort to
cultivate the “good will” of public health officials “and
get them into a receptive frame of mind as to our view-
point.” Bowditch bragged that he believed that his efforts
had “paid off, as, for example, in Chicago, where we have
been able to stave off a paint labeling regulation like that
here in New York.”42
In 1958 New York City proposed a revision of its reg-
ulation of the use of lead paint containing more than 1%
lead, prohibiting its use on interior walls, ceilings, or win-
dow sills of any apartment or room, tenement, multiple
dwelling, or any one or two family home. The reaction of
officials in the NPVLA was predictably ambivalent. E.P.
Hubschmitt, on the NPVLA’s Subcommittee on Uniform
Labeling continued to maintain, despite the mounds of
evidence, that the ingestion of lead was not a serious haz-
ard. In a review of the proposed code he told members
that “many persons of note, . . . question the hazardous
effects of lead by ingestion. I can recall that there is in fact
very little evidence, indeed, in the medical reports to sup-
port incidences of death by ingestion of lead.”43 By 1960
even consultants for the NPVLA acknowledged that “the
dried film of paint may present a hazard during removal
by sanding or burning, if chewed by children, or if the
loose paint is eaten by children.” This conclusion was cir-
culated by the NPVLA to the members of the Subcom-
mittee on Toxicology and Labeling and has been ap-
proved by them for circulation to the Scientific
Committee. This was done because it “summarize[d] the
present state of knowledge as to the toxicity of our in-
dustry’s products . . . .”44
The LIA reported that the mid 1950s “was an active pe-
riod in state legislatures” and that they “followed pro-
posed legislation closely.” In New York State, “a protest
was filed with the proper legislative committee in New
York State against a bill dealing with paint that would be
unnecessarily harmful to both the paint and lead indus-
tries.” The Association proudly informed its members
that “the bill did not come out of committee.”45 Even
though the proportion of lead in paint had been dramat-
ically reduced in the early 1950s as titanium, zinc, and
water based vinyl coverings took over a larger share of
the market, the industry continued to be vigilant to any
attempts to inform the public about the dangers of their
product. When forced, on New Year’s Eve 1957, to accept
the reality of warning labels on paint products, the As-
sociation knew labels were better than other kinds of reg-
ulation: “Every effort is being made to confine . . . regu-
latory measures . . . to the field of warning labels which,
as applied to paint are obviously less detrimental to our
interests than would be any legislation of a prohibitory
nature.”46 In 1958, there was what the Association called
a “veritable wave” of precautionary labeling legislation
proposals and maintained that “watching for adverse leg-
ROSNER AND MARKOWITZ164
islation in our many states is an important part of our
work and one in which the help of our members . . . is
again and earnestly asked.”47
Even by the mid 1950s the industry continued to deny
responsibility for a situation that had been developing for
nearly a half century. Its long-term claim that the indus-
try had done everything it could to be responsible seemed
fatuous in view of the fact that the emergency wards and
hospitals of cities and communities were filled with chil-
dren poisoned by lead. Clearly, the use of a strong warn-
ing label indicated to the public that the industry fully
understood that their product was dangerous. Therefore,
the industry refocused attention on the parents, children,
and even the landlord as the real source of the lead poi-
soning epidemic.
Despite the assertions of the industry that lead poi-
soning would vanish when “ancient slums” were re-
placed with newer dwellings, evidence that lead was still
in new paint continued to appear. New York’s Depart-
ment of Health “disclosed [in1973] that ten companies are
selling highly leaded paints in violation of the New York
City Health Code.” In a survey that tested “one hundred
and thirty eight cans of interior paint from 23 companies
. . . for lead content, twenty-four cans from 10 companies
were found to be highly leaded.”48 Even painted toys con-
tinued to have lead in significant quantities. In 1957,
Robert Kehoe analyzed toys from a variety of companies,
including Mattel and Marx, two of the nation’s largest
manufacturers, and found that the paints that one
Chicago toy manufacturer used on its red trailer trucks
contained over 34 per cent lead. Mattel’s Jack in the Box
was painted with red paint containing 10 percent lead and
Marx’ red fire truck had 3.75 per cent lead.49
It seems that no amount of evidence, no health statis-
tics, no public outrage could get industry to care that their
lead paint was killing and poisoning children. Industry
viewed any mention of the dangers of lead as a public re-
lations disaster. Until the end they continued to wear
moral blinders and to counter bad publicity rather than
address the problem. By 1959, when childhood lead poi-
soning had clearly entered the popular culture through
articles in Parade magazine and television news programs
on CBS, the LIA was still engaged in efforts to restrict
public attention to the issue. When the LIA learned that
the popular television show, Highway Patrol, had in one
of its episodes referred to lead poisoning in a young boy,
the Association’s representatives convinced the produc-
ers to eliminate the offending reference. “We now have
their verbal agreement to eliminate all reference to the
toxicity of lead in an episode of lead of the series which
reflected no credit on the metal or on the producers them-
selves,” the LIA proudly announced in its Quarterly Re-
port.50
The negative publicity about lead paint was of concern
because it “hurts business” and had resulted in “thou-
sands of items in unfavorable publicity every year,” the
industry association argued. Bad publicity “may even
mean that your product won’t be used at all because your
potential customer doesn’t want the problems that the use
of lead may involve.”51 Yet the Association continued to
deny culpability, claiming 1) that childhood lead poison-
ing was primarily a problem of the eastern slums and 2)
was a result of the lack of education, racial inferiority, and
inattentiveness of poor people. They continued to see the
problem as a “headache,” as a public relations issue,
rather than as a public health disaster, and they feared
onerous public regulation. “In the first place, [lead poi-
soning] means thousands of items of unfavorable public-
ity every year. This is particularly true since most cases
of lead poisoning today are in children and anything sad
that happens to a child is meat for newspaper editors and
is gobbled up by the public. It makes no difference that
it is essentially a problem of slums, of public welfare prob-
lem. Just the same the publicity hits us where it hurts.”52
Industry representatives attended meetings where child-
hood lead poisoning was addressed, negotiated with pro-
ducers to revise scripts on television that mentioned lead
poisoning, and continued sponsoring research that they
believed would exonerate lead as a serious threat. As the
publicity about lead poisoning expanded, smaller cities
began to test their own children and, as with the lead poi-
soning epidemic historically, the more they looked, the
more poisonings they found. The LIA acknowledged that
there had been “something of a change” in their under-
standing of the eastern and big city nature of the epidemic
as they began to find reports of childhood lead poisoning
in communities in rural areas and small cities as well.
Lead poisoning was no longer just a problem of “the
slums of our older and larger cities,” but was now ap-
pearing in “smaller centers” like Albany, New York;
Springfield, Massachusetts; Covington, Kentucky; and
Gastonia, North Carolina.53
The problem of childhood lead poisoning, long hidden
from the public by the industry itself, finally emerged as
a major public issue in the 1960s as community activists,
public health officials, and a variety of journalists and en-
vironmentalists made the link between lead poisoning
and urban poverty. By the late 1960s activists such as the
Young Lords in New York City were even taking blood
samples of children living in poorer communities, lead-
ing public health officials to acknowledge the depths of
the problem. As Christian Warren argues in his book,
Brush With Death, “vigorous, direct community agitation
for a political or bureaucratic response [to lead poison-
ing] played out in many cities and towns during the late
1960s.” At the time, activists pointed out the lethargic re-
sponse to the hundreds of thousands of cases of lead poi-
soning in poor communities throughout the country
when compared to the national campaign waged against
another childhood threat, polio.54 By the late 1960s, even
the lead industry acknowledged the dangers of their
product, while never admitting culpability for its past
misdeeds.55
For the past decade lawsuits by representatives of chil-
dren poisoned by lead against the lead industry have
highlighted the terrible impact of this history of victim
blaming. In general, lawyers for these children have ar-
gued that the long history of knowledge and neglect on
the part of the lead industry demands that finally the lead
industry contribute to solving this problem. As John Mc-
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Connell, one of the leading attorneys in these lawsuits,
put it at a recent trial, “this case is about companies that
sold, marketed and promoted white lead carbonate for
use in paint for decades. And during that entire time, they
knew that it could poison children. Let me repeat that.
These defendants, each one of them, knew when they sold
white lead carbonate that it would hurt, and they sold it,
and they marketed it, and they promoted it anyway. And
now they’ll claim no responsibility for the injuries that
have been caused . . . .”56 At this same trial, the position
of the industry replicated the historical arguments out-
lined in this article: children, parents, landlords, even the
government and public health departments were to blame
for lead poisoning. But above all, it was the child who
needed to “change his attitude” and stop looking to so-
ciety or the industry for any help. For example, despite
having been diagnosed with an extraordinarily high
blood-lead level,3 the defense attorney for NL Industries
blatantly argued in some recent cases that it was unfair
to blame lead for the children’s problems. In his closing
statement in one of these cases he told the jury that, de-
spite the fact that the child had very high blood-lead lev-
els, it was probably not lead that was responsible for all
his intellectual, emotional, and behavioral problems.
Rather, it was the child’s negative attitude that had caused
him to fail at school, act out in various social situations,
and get in trouble with the law. If the young man was in
the courtroom, Michael Jones, the attorney for NL Indus-
tries told the jury, “I’d say to him, you can, and God dog
it, you must change your attitude. Your attitude is the
principal thing holding you down in life. That is what I
would say to [him].”57 In another case in Mississippi the
same lawyer represented NL Industries in a suit brought
by African-American parents on behalf of their children
by arguing that “the problems found in the children are
genetic and not due to exposure to lead-based paint.”58
Victim blaming plays well with juries who are often un-
willing to award an African-American child who has
dropped out of school or who has had trouble with the
law or who is, in general, assumed to have no future any-
way, large sums of money.
For much of the century, the lead industry produced,
marketed, and profited from the sale of lead paint for use
in housing around the country. From the 1920s on there
is strong historical evidence that they understood that
lead paint was poisoning children. Yet, for much of the
century the industry was able to deflect attention from its
own role in perpetrating a problem by focusing the na-
tion’s attention on a host of other forces that fed the prob-
lem. Children with pica, “ignorant” parents, children who
weren’t supervised, and, in the 1960s, slum landlords who
profited from dilapidated housing were identified as the
culprits. Obviously, parents who were denied informa-
tion about the dangers of lead, children who were told
through advertisements and booklets that lead protected
health and improved the quality of life, caretakers who
were too overwhelmed to watch children’s every move-
ment, and landlords whose own profits depended on lit-
tle or no maintenance can be seen as part of the larger
constellation of actors who might have held differing roles
in the tragedy. And certainly the children who have and
will be lead poisoned because of paint that covers the na-
tion’s walls are the big losers. But only one actor in this
historical drama has remained immune from the tragedy:
the lead industry that knowingly sold and profited from,
and which actively promoted, the use of this dangerous
product. They left it there knowing the future damage it
would cause—and will continue to cause because of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the
verdict in State v. Lead Industries Association.
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